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From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United 
States. By Sadao Asada. (Annapolis, Md., Naval Institute Press, 
2006. xii  387 pp. $32.95)
For historians of Japan, Japanese-American relations, or the 
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), Sadao Asada is a scholar who needs 
no introduction. Over the past forty years Asada has presented 
bold hypotheses supported with meticulous research. In numer-
ous publications, Asada has successfully woven together military 
history, diplomacy, politics, biography, ideology, and institutional 
behavior. In doing so, he has charted new directions for the study 
of the Japanese navy and other institutions on both sides of the Pa-
cifi c that played a critical yet often oversimplifi ed role in Japanese-
American relations and World War II. His most recent publication 
is no exception. Drawing from forty years of research and also 
supplemented with the use of hitherto overlooked or previously 
unavailable source material, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor is a must-
read for those interested in elite-level Japanese-American relations, 
naval history, the torturous road to Pearl Harbor, and the critical 
role that individuals and institutions can have on national policy 
and diplomacy. It is an excellent study that I recommend without 
reservation.
Asada fi rst documents how various IJN leaders became en-
tranced with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ideas of big ships, big guns, 
and the decisive fl eet battle. Why? In part, Asada suggests that 
this ideology helped the navy justify itself and its grotesquely large 
appropriations requests. Along with this, however, Asada demon-
strates that many IJN leaders were highly selective with Mahan’s 
ideas. While they endorsed the decisive fl eet battle ideology, they 
fundamentally overlooked key aspects of his theories, such as the 
importance of projecting and protecting trade and communica-
tions routes through naval power. This would have devastating 
consequences in World War II as Japan’s merchant fl eet was deci-
mated by U.S. submarine operations.
Asada next explores the politics of naval limitation between 
1921 and 1936. While Asada has written widely on the Washington 
Conference and the war between Admirals Katô Tomosaburô and 
Katô Kanji, he provides new analysis and far more biographical 
details of the participants. His chapters on the politics associated 
with the London Naval Conference, moreover, are the best account 
published in English to date. What becomes clear is that many IJN 
leaders failed to grasp the realities of (or turned a blind eye to) 
the exigencies associated with “total war.” While navy planners had 
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developed intricate tactical battle plans, they often lost sight of the 
bigger picture, namely that war was not just about battles but about 
industrial production, mobilization, and logistics.
In the fi nal sections of this book, Asada engages with the ques-
tion of Japanese-American naval relations: Why did certain IJN 
leaders demand war with the United States in 1941 when they knew 
Japan had so little chance for victory? First, while many IJN offi cers 
believed that Japan had only a slight chance for victory if war was 
initiated in 1941, they were convinced that Japan would have no 
chance of victory if they delayed until 1943. He also argues con-
vincingly that institutional inertia, a lack of responsible leadership, 
and fi erce inter-service rivalry all contributed to the fateful deci-
sion to go to war. How, for instance, could navy leaders who had 
argued vociferously for the end of the naval limitation treaties and 
subsequent naval expansion admit before their army counterparts, 
civilian politicians, and the emperor that they had fundamentally 
misunderstood what constituted national defense in the age of to-
tal war? More to the point, how could navy leaders have admitted, 
after securing a series of extensive and wildly expensive naval ex-
pansion programs, that the IJN simply could not defeat the U.S. 
Navy or even protect Japan from America? Asada’s work reminds 
us that inter-service rivalry was a critically important phenomenon 
that infl uenced virtually every aspect of defense politics, intra-
governmental relations, and military spending in Japan.
In and of themselves, Asada’s last chapters alone are worth the 
price of the book. Anyone interested in learning more about why Ja-
pan went to war with America would be well advised to read Asada’s 
book. His work provides valuable insights into the motivations and 
behavior of Japan’s key naval actors and the critical infl uence they 
had on elite-level decision making. More than that, Asada’s entire 
book makes an invaluable contribution to our understanding of 
the Imperial Japanese Navy and Japanese-American relations. It is a 
great achievement from the doyen of naval history.
University of Melbourne J. CHARLES SCHENCKING
Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a 
Turbulent Era, 1885–1920. By Daniel R. Beaver. (Kent, Ohio, Kent 
University Press, 2006. xvi  281 pp. $49) 
In his 1965 Journal of American History article on Newton D. 
Baker’s role in World War I mobilization, followed by a volume on 
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